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Abstract 
Do natural disasters produce effects on preferences of victims in the long-run? We test the impact 
of the tsunami shock on generosity of a sample of Sri Lankan affected/unaffected microfinance 
borrowers seven years after the event.  
Specifically, we test the effect of the shock at the extensive margin by comparing damaged with 
non-damaged individuals in terms of giving and expected giving in a dictator game. Moreover, at 
the intensive margin, we compare the participants based on the amount of damage experienced and 
recovery aid received. The advantage of this last comparison is that differences in observables 
between the groups are minimized. We reduce further identification problems by selecting a 
random sample of damaged and non-damaged borrowers belonging to the same microfinance 
organization who are, therefore, likely to share some important common traits that are usually 
unobservable to researchers. We complete our identification strategy with weighted least squares, 
instrumental variable estimates and a sensitivity analysis on the exogeneity assumption.  
The main findings of the paper support the hypothesis that the shock affects participants’ 
preferences in the long-run. First, the tsunami negatively affects generosity at the extensive margin 
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as those who suffered at least one damage give and expect less than those who did not. Second, 
while large recovery assistance does not directly affect giving and expected giving, it increases 
especially the latter indirectly, i.e., when interacted with the number of damages.  
Our results reconcile that part of the literature showing evidence of natural shocks having a 
detrimental effect on social preferences (Fleming et al., 2011; Cassar et al., 2013) with that 
supporting, instead, a positive link (Solnit, 2009; Whitt and Wilson, 2007; Cassar et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, since our study focuses on the long-run impact of a natural disaster, previous results 
on short-run effects are not necessarily inconsistent with ours. 
 
 
Keywords: natural disasters; tsunami; giving; dictator game; recovery aid. 
JEL codes: C90, D03, O12. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Natural disasters are dramatic shocks that may produce, beyond all of the visible damages, relevant 
consequences at a micro level by affecting expectations, preferences and choices of economic 
agents with consequences on their consumption/savings and human capital investment decisions 
(see Morris and Wodon, 2003; Gitter and Barham, 2007; Carter et al., 2007; Becchetti and 
Castriota, 2011; Arouri et al., 2015).  
A recent branch of empirical papers has started to investigate this topic with conflicting conclusions 
related to the disaster’s effects on time preferences (Cassar et al., 2011; Callen, 2015), attitudes 
toward risk (Eckel et al., 2009; Cassar et al., 2011; Cameron and Shah, 2015; Willinger et al., 2013; 
Kim and Lee, 2014) and prosocial behaviors (Whitt and Wilson, 2007; Solnit, 2009; Cassar et al., 
2011; Castillo and Carter, 2011; Fleming et al., 2011). For what concerns the latter, Whitt and 
Wilson (2007) consider individuals affected by Hurricane Katrina and find increased group 
cooperation among the evacuees in Houston shelters. Similarly, Solnit (2009) provides evidence 
that disasters are often catalysts for social capital increase and Cassar et al. (2011) - by exploiting 
the variation in victimization status at village level - find that tsunami victims are more trusting and 
moderately more trustworthy. Castillo and Carter (2011) use the community-level variation in 
rainfalls during the Hurricane Mitch in 1998 as a proxy for damage intensity and find that 
intermediate shocks promote cooperation while extreme shocks undercut it. On the contrary, 
Fleming et al. (2011) find that residents of the areas affected by the Chilean 2010 earthquake reveal 
significantly less trustworthiness than those of non-affected ones. Only a few studies, however, 
focus on generosity. In particular, Li et al. (2013) compare dictator-game behavior of Chinese 
children before and after the 2008-earthquake and find that its effects on generosity vary by age, 
being negative on 6-year-olds and positive on 9-year-olds children. The 2008 Chinese Wenchuan 
earthquake has been shown by Rao et al. (2011) as affecting positively adults' generosity. This 
effect is shown to increase with the levels of residential devastation. 
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In this study, we focus on the long-term impact of the 2004-tsunami on the generosity of inhabitants 
of the Sri Lankan southern-coast affected by the shock at different degrees. We contribute in four 
main respects to the current debate that clearly presents mixed evidence regarding the direction of 
the effects of disaster.  
First, we argue that the factors that may help to explain the observed heterogeneous results in the 
literature are, on the one hand, the degree of damage suffered and, on the other hand, the contextual 
recovery aid received by damaged villagers. For this purpose, we collect and use information on 
both the type of damages and of recovery aid received.  
Second, Callen (2015) and Cassar et al. (2011) collected data and ran experiments on the effects of 
the tsunami on trust, risk and time preferences in mid-2007 and mid-2009, respectively, while our 
database dates December 2011, seven years after the catastrophe. This longer time horizon allows 
us to capture longer run disaster and recovery effects on victims’ preferences.  
Third, different from both Callen (2015) and Cassar et al. (2011), by exploiting information on 
individuals' victimization statuses as well as on the intensity of damages and recovery aid within 
each village, we do not measure the impact of the shock at the village level but rather at the 
individual level. This approach reduces heterogeneity between the treatment group (village 
inhabitants affected by the tsunami) and the control group (unaffected village inhabitants).  
Fourth, both damaged and non-damaged individuals in our study belong to a selected group of 
individuals borrowing from the same microfinance organization (MFI). This implies that they share 
some common unobservable factors (i.e., sense of entrepreneurship, trustworthiness) that are 
typically inaccessible to the experimenter and are the main drivers of self-selection. These factors 
also help this group of individuals to pass the screening of the same MFI that has salient incentives 
to select only potentially successful borrowers. Furthermore, because the MFI under our scrutiny 
organizes frequent borrower meetings (as many others traditionally do), we also reasonably assume 
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that damaged and non-damaged individuals share similar cultural features represented by the 
organization ethos. In addition to it, only damaged individuals who were AMF borrowers before the 
tsunami could receive aid according to donors’ rules and AMF policies and this institutional aspect 
rules out the suspect of correlation between unobservable characteristics and the status of damaged 
borrowers in our sample. 
The combination of these features, jointly with the results of inverse p-score weighted least squares 
as well as instrumental variable estimations and a sensitivity analysis on the exogeneity assumption 
implemented as robustness checks, contribute to mitigate the identification problem arising from the 
impossibility of randomizing ex-ante the calamity experience and from the lack of pre-tsunami 
individual information. To address the non-representativeness of our sample composed by 
microfinance borrowers, we implement a post-stratification weighted least squares estimate based 
on Census data. 
Our findings show that the tsunami negatively affects generosity after seven years from the 
calamity; however, especially for the highly damaged individuals, this effect is compensated by the 
recovery assistance received. These results suggest the existence of an indirect and non-material 
channel (i.e. indirect reciprocity) through which properly targeted recovery aid compensates for the 
losses in pro-social attitudes caused by the disaster.  
The paper is divided into seven sections. In the second, we formulate research hypotheses, illustrate 
the experiment background and describe our research design. In the third we present descriptive 
findings and in the fourth we discuss results on hypotheses testing. In the fifth and sixth we 
illustrate and comment on our econometric findings and robustness checks. The seventh section 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. RESEARCH DESIGN  
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In what follows we first formulate research hypotheses (subsection 2.1). We then sketch the 
historical scenario in which our research is conducted (subsection 2.2) and discuss the details of our 
experiment design (subsection 2.3). 
2.1 Research hypotheses 
Our aim is to test whether the tsunami shock affects generosity as proxied for in a dictator game 
(see section 2.3 for details) by:  
i) sender’s giving; 
ii) receiver’s expectation regarding sender’s giving.  
Given the longer time distance from the shock in our experiment with respect to similar studies in 
the literature, our hypotheses may be considered as tests on the long-run effects of the tsunami on 
social preferences. More formally, we first test the null hypothesis that the tsunami has no long-run 
impact at the extensive margin on giving or on expected giving using the following two 
specifications (see subsection 2.3 for a detailed description of the damages variables): 
i) Giving H0: G Dam = G NonDam    
ii) Expected Giving H0: E[G] Dam = E[G] NonDam   
where G Dam and G NonDam are, respectively, the amounts given by damaged and non-damaged 
senders, while E[G] Dam and E[G] NonDam are the amounts that recipients from the two groups expect 
to receive from the sender.  
Our alternative hypotheses (H1i,ii) are that the calamity does reduce giving and expected giving. The 
channels through which this might occur are of economic and psychological type. With respect to 
the first mechanism, natural catastrophes can decrease generosity through reduced savings and 
increased propensity to precautionary savings. After a natural hazard – and especially in developing 
countries where insurance schemes are weakly implemented – damaged people might be forced to 
use their personal resources to recover, for example by re-building the house or the office, re-
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buying the working tools or raw materials or just to survive until the economic situation improves. 
For the same reason, even well after recovery, individuals might react by increasing their savings to 
cope with possible similar events in the future (Roson et al., 2007). In a theoretical model of 
constant absolute risk aversion, Freeman et al. (2003) show that the optimal amount of 
precautionary savings depends on the expected losses, which in turn depend on the probability of 
the event, the damages suffered and the individual risk aversion. Therefore, the rise in the expected 
probability of negative events and the damage entity are expected to increase savings, especially if 
people become more risk averse (Cassar et al., 2011; Cameron and Shah, 2015) and more patient 
(Callen, 2015).  
With respect to the second mechanism, the literature has shown that natural disasters produce 
unhappiness, bad mood and anger, which can negatively affect interactions and cooperation. 
Västfjall et al. (2008) find that the effect elicited by reminding Swedish undergraduates about the 
2004-tsunami disaster negatively influences their judgments on wellbeing, future optimistic 
thinking and risk perceptions. Happiness levels are shown in turn to influence the taste for social 
comparisons as the willingness to lower another person’s payoff below one’s own is correlated with 
unhappiness (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001). The aforementioned channels could possibly have 
played a role in reducing generosity as calamities decrease happiness of damaged people in 
developing and developed contexts (Becchetti and Castriota, 2010 and 2011; Luechinger and 
Raschky, 2009). 
Previous studies have found evidence of a non-linear impact of shocks magnitude on preferences 
(e.g., Castillo and Carter, 2011). This leads us to consider also the impact of the tsunami at the 
intensive margin, by testing the null hypotheses of insignificant differences in giving and expected 
giving between those with a large vis-à-vis those with a small amount of damages: 
iii) Giving H0: G HighDam = G LowDam    
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iv) Expected giving H0: E[G] HighDam = E[G] LowDam    
Furthermore, to test whether damaged individuals are affected differently according to the amount 
of damage experienced and the recovery aid received1, we draw additional hypotheses on the effect 
of solidarity help on giving and expected giving of respondents who incurred a high amount of 
damage:  
v) Giving H0: G HighDam|HighHelp = G HighDam/LowHelp   
vi) Expected giving H0: E[G]HighDam|HighHelp = E[G]HighDam/LowHelp    
where HighDam are victims who suffered more than two damages (two is the median number of 
damages) and LowDam are people who suffered less than or equal to two damages; HighHelp are 
individuals who received more than the sample average level of help (i.e., Helpindex>0.113), while 
LowHelp are individuals who received an amount of help equal to or below the average level of 
help (i.e., Helpindex≤0.113).  
The null hypotheses test herein states that individuals who receive high damages and help above the 
average do not show differences in their long-term preferences from those who did not receive help 
above the average level in the presence of serious damages. Accordingly, the rejection of the null 
hypotheses implies that significant help in the presence of high damages matters. The rationales 
supporting the alternative (H1v,vi) are in line with the economic and psychological arguments 
described above. From an economic point of view, unprecedentedly high compensation from public 
institutions and foreign donors might decrease precautionary savings through moral hazard effects 
since, in case of future catastrophes, people rely on external support. This phenomenon, known as 
the Samaritan’s Dilemma (Buchanan, 1975; Coate, 1995) or the Charity Hazard (Raschky and 
Weck-Hannemann, 2007; Dobes et al., 2014) has been found empirically by Berlemann et al. 
																																																						
1 Regarding the role of post-shock relief on social behavior see, among others, Fearon et al. (2009) 
and Korf et al. (2010).  
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(2015) with German GSOEP data.2 On the psychological side Becchetti and Castriota (2010, 2011) 
document that post-disaster aid produces convergence of damaged individuals to previous levels of 
both economic and psychological wellbeing. This result is consistent with the above-mentioned 
nexus between psychological wellbeing and giving attitudes, which is grounded in the literature and 
in line with our alternative hypothesis.  
A further rationale for the positive effect of post-disaster aid on giving is indirect reciprocity. This 
type of preference is widely recognized as an important mechanism for the evolution of cooperation 
in natural and social sciences, both theoretically and empirically (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Nowak and 
Sigmund, 2005; Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001).  So far experimental evidence of strong indirect 
reciprocity was available mainly in lab-experiments involving undergraduate students (e.g. 
Dufwenberg et al., 2001; Guth et al., 2001; Stanca, 2009) and not tested on individuals who lived 
strong real life experiences of shock and recovery. Specifically, the rejection of the null hypothesis 
in favor of H1v,vi can be supported by the fact that highly damaged individuals witnessed very 
critical conditions after the tsunami but received larger recovery assistance, as documented also in 
our data and in previous studies (Becchetti and Castriota, 2010 and 2011). This, in turn, would have 
activated in them a higher and long-lasting sense of gratitude than in those who received less or no 
damages from the tsunami. A plausible rationale for our alternative hypothesis is therefore that 
those who have lived in their past a strong memorable and intense experience of a shock followed 
																																																						
2 The authors study the European Flood of August 2002 and find that, as a possible consequence of 
the Samaritan’s Dilemma, the natural disaster depressed individual saving decisions. In Germany, 
well-established compulsory insurance schemes, public funding and donations were so high that 
they turned out to provide almost total compensation (Linnerooth-Bayer et al., 2001), which is not 
our case. Nevertheless, those people who registered the highest number of damages and received 
more financial assistance might have reduced precautionary savings and thus increased generosity. 
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by a large recovery aid do not forget the help received and therefore behave (and expect others to 
behave) generously even under milder circumstances as those reproduced in our experiment. 
2.2 The Background   
Sri Lanka was severely affected by the 2004-tsunami. Over 1,000 km of coast (two-thirds of the 
country’s coastline) were affected by the storm. The disaster caused dramatic human (over 35,000 
dead and 443,000 displaced people) and economic losses (24,000 boats, 11,000 businesses and 
88,500 houses damaged or destroyed). Several international organizations and NGOs offered aid 
and support. The specific characteristics of this event was that it may have randomly affected 
individuals living a short distance from each other based on their location with respect to the 
waterline at the moment of the tsunami struck (Figure 1 in the online Appendix). As it typically 
occurs in natural disasters the variation in damage was quite strong and randomly affecting 
inhabitants along the coast (and specifically in the area considered in our research) due to factors 
such as the irregular shape of land but also the irregularity of the same run-up and height of the 
wave, of other manmade structures, of natural barriers between the coast and the damaged houses. 
As a consequence each affected member had between her/him and the coast different natural and 
manmade obstacles not depending on her/his will that could reduce/not reduce (together with the 
irregularity of wave intensity) the impact of the wave on their houses. Evidence of the importance 
of these factors in the tsunami event is provided, among others, by Liu et al. (2005) for Sri Lanka, 
Tanaka (2011) for West Java. Thus, this unfortunate event created a particularly favorable scenario 
for investigating the effects of calamities and aid on individual preferences in a quasi-experimental 
environment. 
In November 2011, our research team conducted the field portion of this study in Sri Lanka with the 
support of a local staff. Using a list of clients obtained from a local microfinance institution, Agro 
Micro Finance (AMF), we randomly selected 382 borrowers (all of them identified and interviewed 
thanks to the help of the AMF staff thereby eliminating the related attrition problem). To the best of 
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our knowledge, only one microfinance organization is present in the selected villages and therefore 
no randomization is possible at the organizational level. Of those borrowers, with the help of the 
AMF staff, we identified a group of individuals affected by the 2004-tsunami and a group of 
individuals who were not affected by the seaquake. Participants in our experiment originated from 
three villages located on the southern coast of Sri Lanka, namely, Galle, Matara and Hambantota. 
As documented by Figure 2 in the online Appendix, the three chosen villages were only partially 
affected by the calamity. This circumstance provides us with the opportunity to exploit such within-
village heterogeneity. Hence, in contrast to the studies summarized in the introduction, where all 
damaged people were selected from one village and all non-damaged people were from another 
one, we sampled both damaged and non-damaged participants within each of the three villages. The 
distribution of damaged borrowers within villages is as follows: 65.8 percent in Galle, 54.5 percent 
in Matara and 44.5 percent in Hambantota. 
AMF loan officers informed us about the damaged/non-damaged status of the borrowers prior to 
beginning the experiment. Hence we were able to assign ex-ante participants to the correct group, 
damaged or non-damaged, in each village and therefore avoid potential framing effects arising from 
asking players for their damaged/non-damaged status before the beginning of the game.  
Moreover, our sample is not likely to suffer from post-tsunami migration because of the economic 
activity held in loco and the high incentives for damaged individuals to recover from the calamity 
and stay. Such incentives include incoming flows of aid and the concession of micro-loans at 
favorable conditions as a result of the AMF’s portfolio recapitalization after the tsunami (Becchetti 
and Castriota, 2010 and 2011). Around 24.4 percent of the MFI loan portfolio was damaged after 
the shock, but the liquidity provided by foreign institutions (USAID, UNDP, the Italian MFI 
Etimos) allowed AMF to avoid credit restrictions. The loans received by AMF helped damaged 
clients to recover from the calamity so that already in 2007 the gap with respect to non-damaged 
had reduced or disappeared. This could contribute to explain the evidence provided by AMF 
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showing that only six out of four thousands of borrowers migrated the year after the Tsunami 
(2005). Likewise, with data on tornado victims in Bangladesh, Paul (2005) provides similar 
empirical evidence showing that there is no out-migration because in monetary terms the disaster 
relief received was bigger than the damage incurred.  
2.3 The Experiment    
The fieldwork consists of three parts: i) an experimental session to elicit generosity and risk 
preferences, ii) a socio-demographic survey, iii) a final lottery game to elicit (and control for) time 
preferences.  
With respect to the experimental session, we implemented three games: a dictator game (DG), a 
risky investment game (RG) and a lottery game (LG). The first game is the target of our 
investigation while, as it is customary in many experiments, the risk and preference games were 
conceived just as more clean ways of measuring important controls in our estimates given that risk 
aversion and time preferences have often been found to affect the payoffs of experiments (e.g. 
Curry et al., 2008; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). We randomly alternated the two games to avoid 
order effects.3  
The DG is a standard game largely adopted in the literature to elicit generosity in an incentive-
compatible way (see, for instance, Eckel and Grossman, 1996 and Engel, 2011). The game involves 
two types of players, a sender (S) and a receiver (R). Their true identity is not revealed, and thus no 
player can identify the person with whom (s)he is playing. S is endowed with 900 LKR (the 
equivalent of 5.74 €) and must decide how much of it to send to R; R takes no actions in this game 
and receives the amount of money sent by S. According to the classic utility theory, the sender’s 
																																																						
3 We do not find any significant effect of the damaged/non-damaged status or the kind of damages 
on risk/time preferences (results are omitted for reasons of space and are available upon request). 
This suggests lack of collinearity problems when using them in our estimates. 
		 13	
maximum utility is reached by sending 0 LKR and keeping the entire endowment (900 LKR). Any 
sender amount deviating from 0 is interpreted as a measure of generosity. The role of experiment 
participants is randomly selected. The experimental protocol is described in details in the online 
Appendix A.2b.  
The RG used to capture risk aversion consists of a simple investment decision where participants 
endowed with 300 and must decide whether to keep the money (option 1) or invest any portion x of 
the money in a risky asset that has a 50 percent chance of success (option 2). The investment pays 
3x the amount invested if successful, but zero if unsuccessful. The LG is implemented to measure 
time preferences and it is based on a real lottery in which each participant choose whether to receive 
a given amount of money two months from the interview date or a larger amount (of varying size) 
eight months later. Further details on these games and the experimental sheets are reported on line 
in Appendix A (sections A1a-A1b) and Appendix B respectively.  
At the end of the experimental session, participants are asked questions concerning socio-
demographic information, social preferences, damages incurred in 2004 with respect to seven 
dimensions (i.e., personal injuries; injuries to family members; damages to house, economic 
activity, buildings/assets, working tools, raw materials) and recovery aid they received shortly after 
the tsunami with respect to eight dimensions (i.e., money, credit, food, medicines, raw materials, 
working tools, consumption, other). Survey-based information on social preferences are also 
collected through standard GSS questions (see the questionnaire in the online Appendix B).  
Information on type of damage and recovery aid experienced are collected through direct survey 
questions asked to AMF borrowers and verified by the AMF loan officers (see Table 1 and the 
online Appendix B for further details). Using this information, we classify individuals in our sample 
into damaged vs. non-damaged (variable damaged) and high vs. low level of help (variable 
help_ab_mean), respectively, if they have vs. have not experienced at least one damage from the 
tsunami and the sum of recovery aid they received (across all of the above-mentioned dimensions) 
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is above vs. below the sample mean. By using the total sum of damages the individuals reported 
(variable n_damages), we evaluate the impact of the tsunami on generosity at the intensive margin 
as well (see Variable Legend in Table 1 for further details). For the description of the interview 
process and the experimental protocol see the online Appendix A.2a-A.2b. 
Table 1 - Variable legend 
Variable Description 
Giving amount sent by the sender / initial endowment (900 LKR) 
Expected_Giving sender's amount expected by the receiver/sender's initial endowment (900 LKR) 
Receiver = 1 if the player is a receiver; = 0 if the player is a sender 
Age respondent’s age 
Male =1 if the respondent is male 
Married =1 if the respondent is married 
Widowed =1 if the respondent is widowed 
Separated =1 if the respondent is separated 
Single =1 if the respondent is single 
N_house_members number of house components 
Years_schooling respondent’s years of schooling 
Food_exp_std monthly respondent's household food expenditure (in LKR, scaled by 1000) 
Agriculture = 1 if the respondent works in the agricultural sector 
Manufacturing = 1 if the respondent works in the manufacturing sector 
Fishery = 1 if the respondent works in the fishery sector 
Trading = 1 if the respondent works in the trading sector 
Riskloving amount invested in the risky option of the risky investment game 
Riskloving_ratio amount invested in the risky option of the risky investment game/maximum amount investible (300 LKR) 
Switch 
potential lottery number at which the participant switches from option A (receive 10,000 LKR after 2 
months) to option B (receive 10,000 + x LKR after 8 months). It is a real number between 1 and 9; it is =1 
if the participant chooses B from the first potential lottery and never switches to A (maximum degree of 
patience); it is =9 if the participant chooses A from the first potential lottery and never switches to B 
(maximum degree of impatience). See relevant game sheets in the online Appendix B for the options in 
each lottery.  
Galle = 1 if the respondent lives in the Galle district 
Matara = 1 if the respondent lives in the Matara district 
Hambantota = 1 if the respondent lives in the Hambantota district 
Most_can_be_trusted "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" 1 = Must be careful, 2 = Most people can be trusted 
Cant_rely respondent answers 1 to 5 Likert scale agreement with the statement, "Currently, you cannot rely on anybody." 
People_take_advantage respondent answers 1 to 5 Likert scale agreement with the statement, "If you are not careful, other people will take advantage of you." 
Trustindex  = (most_can_be_trusted+cant_rely+ people_take_advantage)/3 
BMI respondent's body mass index = weight/height2 
Distance_housecoast  respondent's distance from the coast at the time of 2004 tsunami (in Km) 
Distant =1 if respondent lived above the median distance from the coast (3 Km) at the time of 2004 tsunami 
Loancycle total number of loan repaid (borrower's seniority) 
Personal_Injury =1 if the respondent reports personal injuries caused by tsunami  
Family_Injury =1 if the respondent reports injuries to relatives caused by tsunami 
Damage_house =1 if the respondent reports damages to the house caused by tsunami 
Damage_econ_activity =1 if the respondent reports damages to the economic activity caused by tsunami 
Damage_assets =1 if the respondent reports damages to assets caused by tsunami 
Damage_tools =1 if the respondent reports damages to working tools caused by tsunami 
Damage_raw_material
s =1 if the respondent reports damages to raw materials caused by tsunami 
N_damages = sum of all of the above-described damages reported by the respondent 
N_dam_ab_med = 1 if N_damages > 2 [2 is the sample median of N_damages conditional on Damaged =1] 
Damaged =1 if the respondent reports at least one type of damage 
Money_aid =1 if the respondent received financial aid (non-microfinance) after the tsunami 
Credit_aid =1 if the respondent received financial support (microfinance) after the tsunami 
Food_aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of food after the tsunami 
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Medicines_aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of medicines after the tsunami 
Rawmaterials_aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of raw materials for repairing/rebuilding house after the tsunami 
Tools_aid =1 if the respondent received assistance in terms of working tools after the tsunami 
Consumption_aid =1 if the respondent received consumption aid after the tsunami 
Other_aid =1 if the respondent received other aid after the tsunami 
Helpindex  = sum of *_aid dummies /8  
Help_ab_mean = 1 if Helpindex > 0.113 [0.113 is the sample mean of Helpindex] 
 
The incentives provided to participants should encourage truthful reporting as the amount at stake is 
very large considering the participants' standards of living. Even if we ignore the payment from the 
lottery, the maximum payoff from one of the games (900 LKR) represents, in our sample, 
approximately 51 percent of the median per capita monthly food expenditure.  
 
3. DESCRIPTIVE FINDINGS 
Summary statistics of our sample document that the average age of the participants is 47 and most 
of them, around 94 percent, are women. This replicates the data of some of the main microfinance 
organizations in Asia (Panel A, Table 2).4 The average number of household members is 4.5, the 
majority of our sample participants is married (84 percent) and the average number of schooling 
years is 10.5 (two and a half years of secondary school). Slightly more than half of the participants 
(54 percent) suffered from at least one type of damage from the tsunami (variable damaged). Panel 
B in Table 1 reports the distribution of the recovery aid for the full sample. Most individuals 
received food (19 percent), money or medicines (respectively, 16 percent and 15 percent), and tools 
(14 percent). The sample mean of the standardized sum of aid types is 0.113 (variable helpindex) 
with 34 percent of people receiving an amount of help above this number (variable help_ab_mean). 
As presented in Panel C of Table 2, most of the villagers with at least one damage experience losses 
																																																						
4 Roodman (2012) documents that, after 1985, the year in which the policy of lending to women 
became official, Grameen converged to 97% with respect to loans to women. This figure is close to 
the 93%t share of the other main microfinance institution (BRAC) operating in South Asia.  
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to economic activity (77 percent) and to office buildings/assets (44 percent), while approximately 
40 percent report damages to working tools or raw materials, 26 percent declare damages to the 
house, 23 percent report injuries to relatives and only a small fraction, 9 percent, receives personal 
injury aid. Among the damaged, the mean number of damages is 2.6 (variable N_damages) with  
Table 2 - Summary statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Panel A. Socio-Demographic Variables 
Age 382 46.793 12.100 12 71 
Single 382 0.045 0.206 0 1 
Widowed 382 0.099 0.300 0 1 
Married 382 0.838 0.369 0 1 
Separated 382 0.018 0.134 0 1 
Male 382 0.065 0.248 0 1 
Food_exp_std 381 8.701 6.927 0.4 120 
Galle 382 0.223 0.416 0 1 
Hambantota 382 0.288 0.453 0 1 
Years_schooling 374 10.505 2.499 0 16 
N_house_members 382 4.521 1.412 1 10 
Agriculture 382 0.220 0.415 0 1 
Trading 382 0.374 0.485 0 1 
Fishery 382 0.037 0.188 0 1 
Manufacturing 382 0.317 0.466 0 1 
Trustindex 380 1.212 0.342 0.667 2.667 
Loancycle 382 2.050 3.214 0 28 
Distance_housecoast 372 6.867 10.756 0 100 
Distant 382 0.492 0.501 0 1 
BMI 379 23.517 5.409 12.095 74.002 
Damaged 382 0.542 0.499 0 1 
Panel B. Recovery Aid after tsunami  
Money_aid 382 0.162 0.369 0 1 
Credit_aid 380 0.061 0.239 0 1 
Food_aid 381 0.192 0.394 0 1 
Medicines_aid 381 0.155 0.362 0 1 
Rawmaterials_aid 382 0.079 0.269 0 1 
Tools_aid 382 0.144 0.352 0 1 
Consumption_aid 382 0.102 0.303 0 1 
Other_aid 376 0.011 0.103 0 1 
Helpindex 372 0.113 0.201 0 0.875 
Help_ab_mean 372 0.339 0.474 0 1 
Panel C. Damages after tsunami (only damaged) 
Personal_Injury 207 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Family_Injury 206 0.228 0.421 0 1 
Damage_house 206 0.262 0.441 0 1 
Damage_econ_activity 206 0.767 0.424 0 1 
Damage_assets 206 0.437 0.497 0 1 
Damage_tools 206 0.417 0.494 0 1 
Damage_raw_materials 206 0.393 0.490 0 1 
N_damages 207 2.580 1.782 0 7 
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N_dam_ab_med 207 0.449 0.499 0 1 
Panel D. Game Variables 
Giving 191 0.339 0.188 0 1 
Expected_giving 191 0.405 0.194 0 1 
Receiver 382 0.500 0.501 0 1 
Riskloving_ratio 382 0.590 0.285 0 1 
Switch 382 5.861 2.987 1 9 
Variable legend: see Table 1 
approximately 45 percent reporting a number of damages above this number (variable 
N_dam_ab_mean).  
Aid is significantly correlated with damage while uncorrelated per se with most of other 
individual’s observable characteristics (results omitted for reasons of space). When looking at the 
aid received by types of damage, in general those who report damages to the house and or injuries 
show a larger amount of recovery assistance received than those who report only losses to the 
economic activity (the difference is statistically significant under all comparisons; for details see the 
online Appendix A.2c). Finally, Panel D of Table 2 indicates that almost 63 percent of the 
participants are relatively impatient5 and, on average, 60 percent of the amount at disposal is 
invested in the risky option (variable Riskloving, see Table 1 and the online Appendix A1a-b and B 
for further details). 
To determine whether the identification problem is serious, we implement non-parametric tests to 
check for satisfaction of the balancing properties between damaged and non-damaged individuals. 
Given the lack of pre-tsunami information on our respondents across the considered socio-
demographic and economic dimensions, we use current individual characteristics to check for 
satisfaction of balancing properties even though they may be endogenous  (the tsunami could have 
affected them). Consider, however, that some of our controls are variables that are not likely to be 
affected by the shock (e.g., age, education, gender, etc.). We find that some differences are 
																																																						
5 They switch from option A to option B in a potential lottery number greater than or equal to the 
median (i.e., seven). See online Appendix A.1b for details of the lottery game. 
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significant at the 5 percent level (Panel A, Table A3.1 in the online Appendix) as the damaged 
individuals are, on average, 4.5 years older, married and, as expected, living closer to the coast (3.5 
Km vs. 10.9 Km) than the non-damaged individuals. This is consistent with higher survival rates to 
the tsunami shock of young adult males as documented by Frankenberg et al. (2011).	  However, 
most of the significant differences at the 5 percent level in the observables vanish if we discriminate 
within the damaged group using the number of damages reported (Panel B, Table A3.1 in the online 
Appendix) or when comparing all individuals receiving more vs. those receiving less than the 
sample average amount of aid (Panel C, Table A3.1 in the online Appendix). Furthermore, under 
this last comparison, the recovery assistance seems to have reached the most affected individuals as 
people with a larger number of damages also received significantly more aid than those reporting 
fewer damages. In sum, when comparing individuals either by the number of damages or the 
amount of the help received, our sample is balanced regarding most of the socio-demographic 
characteristics. The only exceptions are the civil status (in particular, separated) and the 
employment sector (in particular, agriculture), which are controlled for in the econometric analysis.  
 
4. HYPOTHESIS TESTING: RESULTS 
In Table 3, we report the results of all of the non-parametric tests for the hypotheses outlined in 
section 2.1 plus some additional checks that are useful for placing our results in a clearer 
framework. Hypotheses i and ii are tested in Panel A.1, while hypotheses iii and iv in Panel B.1.  
Results from the non-parametric tests suggest a negative and significant relationship between the 
tsunami experience and giving and expected giving at the extensive margin with damaged 
participants showing less generosity than non-damaged ones (Panel A.1).  Moreover, a preliminary 
statistical analysis at the intensive margin documents a weakly significant correlation between 
number of damages and giving and expected giving among the damaged as well as a non-linear 
		 19	
relationship between damages and generosity for the whole sample. As we further discuss in section 
5.2, this result can depend on the fact that the N_damages variable indirectly captures also the 
amount of recovery aid received by the damaged individuals. In fact, for these persons both 
variables affect generosity in the same direction, though their effect is (marginally) significant only 
for receivers (see Panels B.1 and B.2 of Table 3). For this reason, we try to disentangle the effect of 
the recovery aid from that of the damages through the statistical tests presented below and, in order 
to net out potential confounders, through the regression analysis on the whole sample (section 5.2). 
 
Table 3 - Testing Generosity By Damage 
Variable Group Obs Mean Std. dev. Non-par. Mann–Whitney U test: 
          (z-stat. in parenthesis; p-value in italic) 
A) WHOLE SAMPLE 
panel A.1 
Giving 
Non-damaged 89 0.372 0.205 (2.129) 
Damaged 102 0.31 0.168 0.033 
Expected_giving 
Non-damaged 86 0.433 0.179 (2.519) 
Damaged 105 0.383 0.204 0.012 
panel A.2 
Giving 
Helpindex<0.113 121 0.341 0.201 (-0.175) 
Helpindex>0.113 65 0.34 0.163 0.861 
Expected_giving 
Helpindex<0.113 125 0.391 0.19 (-1.382) 
Helpindex>0.113 61 0.44 0.202 0.167 
B) DAMAGED ONLY 
Panel B.1 
Giving 
N_Damages≤2 57 0.301 0.171 (-0.824) 
N_Damages>2 45 0.322 0.165 0.41 
Expected_giving 
N_Damages≤2 57 0.346 0.197 (-1.882) 
N_Damages>2 48 0.427 0.205 0.06 
Panel B.2 
Giving  
Helpindex≤0.113 48 0.308 0.165 (-0.308) 
Helpindex>0.113 51 0.323 0.172 0.758 
Expected_giving   
Helpindex≤0.113 57 0.347 0.178 (-1.843) 
Helpindex>0.113 44 0.436 0.228 0.065 
Panel B.3 -  N_Damages > 2 
Giving  
Helpindex≤0.113 15 0.282 0.164 (-1.109) 
Helpindex>0.113 30 0.342 0.165 0.268 
Expected_giving   
Helpindex≤0.113 18 0.337 0.134 (-2.689) 
Helpindex>0.113 26 0.508 0.22 0.007 
Panel B.4 - N_Damages ≤ 2 
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Giving  
Helpindex≤0.113 33 0.319 0.167 (0.772) 
Helpindex>0.113 21 0.295 0.181 0.44 
Expected_giving   
Helpindex≤0.113 39 0.352 0.197 (0.488) 
Helpindex>0.113 18 0.333 0.202 0.626 
Variable legend: see Table 1 
 
 
As previously shown, recovery aid does not directly affect generosity when comparing damaged 
and non damaged individuals (Panel A.2 of Table 3). Results on the impact of the shock on giving 
and expected giving go in the same direction. This fact supports the assumption that the shock 
affects the way participants behave as senders and they expect to be treated as receivers, 
presumably because receivers expect to be treated as they would do in the senders’ position and 
vice versa. To check for the indirect effects of aid on behavior (i.e., through the damages caused by 
the shock), we restrict our sample only to tsunami-affected individuals and test hypotheses v and vi 
non-parametrically (Panel B.3 of Table 3). Results show that generosity varies according to the 
amount of aid received among the damaged. All of these facts together suggest the existence of a 
positive role of well-targeted recovery aid (i.e., when it reaches the most needy persons) in 
counterbalancing the negative impact of the tsunami on generosity, especially in terms of expected 
giving.  
 
5. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
Econometric estimates enrich our non-parametric tests by verifying the impact of additional 
covariates on giving, expected giving and by checking for the robustness of our previous results to 
the inclusion of covariates. The specification we test is:  
Yi = α0 +α1Damagedi +∑kβkXki +∑jγjGji + εit 
where Y is the dependent variable, that is - according to the specification chosen - the share of the 
endowment sent for senders (variable giving in senders’ estimates), the amount that receivers expect 
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to receive (variable expected giving in receivers’ estimates) or both (in full sample estimates); 
Damaged is the treatment dummy variable, and the X socio-demographic controls include age, 
gender, years of education, village dummies, marital status dummies, household's monthly food 
expenditure (food_exp_std), number of household members (n_house_members), a variable 
measuring borrower seniority (the number of loan cycles) plus three dummies for the respondent’s 
working activity (trading, fishery and manufacturing). The G variables are our experimental 
measures of time and risk attitudes (see section 3 and online Appendix).  
In an alternative specification, we replace the damaged variable with the number of damages 
reported by each individual (variable N_damages), a dummy equal to one for those receiving an 
amount of help above the sample average (variable help_ab_mean) and the interaction term 
between these two (N_damages*help_ab_mean). This allows us to consider the impact of the 
tsunami on generosity at the intensive margin as well the interaction between damages and recovery 
aid.   
5.1 The impact of the tsunami experience  
First, when considering giving as dependent variable (the giving variable) the estimates document 
that none of the controls is significant at 5 percent level (Table 4), except for the amount invested in 
the risky option (riskloving_ratio), which is positive and significant.6 In general, Single, Separated 
and Male could turn to be insignificant possibly because of their low sample size (between 2 and 6 
percent of cases). The damage dummy is negative and significant as senders affected by the tsunami 
																																																						
6 For the relations between risk attitudes and social preferences, see, among others, Beck (1994) and 
Bohnet et al. (2008). Aside from being a possible proxy for income- and wealth-related factors not 
fully captured by the food expenditure variable, the risk-preference variable is significant also 
because of the multi-game nature of the experiment according to which payments depend on one 
randomly selected game. 
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give approximately 6 percentage points less than those who are not affected (a magnitude equal to 
the effect measured in the non-parametric tests in section 4). Tobit estimates that take into account 
the left and right limits of our dependent variable confirm this first result.  
 
Table 4 - Determinants of Giving  
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Giving OLS OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
              
Damaged -0.0614** -0.0579** -0.0584** -0.0611** -0.0572** -0.0570** 
 
(0.0274) (0.0278) (0.0290) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0284) 
Riskloving_ratio 
 
0.108** 0.116** 
 
0.112** 0.119** 
  
(0.0454) (0.0478) 
 
(0.0465) (0.0471) 
Switch 
 
-0.00770* -0.00806* 
 
-0.00793* -0.00833* 
  
(0.00448) (0.00469) 
 
(0.00459) (0.00462) 
Age 
  
-0.00165 
  
-0.00169 
   
(0.00123) 
  
(0.00121) 
Single 
  
-0.0557 
  
-0.0526 
   
(0.0684) 
  
(0.0655) 
Widowed 
  
0.0226 
  
0.0241 
   
(0.0344) 
  
(0.0332) 
Separated 
  
0.110 
  
0.109 
   
(0.0792) 
  
(0.0756) 
Male 
  
0.0258 
  
0.0225 
   
(0.0605) 
  
(0.0603) 
Food_exp_std 
  
-0.000450 
  
-0.000381 
   
(0.000995) 
  
(0.000970) 
Galle 
  
-0.00880 
  
-0.00820 
   
(0.0356) 
  
(0.0353) 
Hambantota 
  
-0.0473 
  
-0.0457 
   
(0.0354) 
  
(0.0345) 
Years_schooling 
  
-0.00273 
  
-0.00275 
   
(0.00647) 
  
(0.00627) 
N_house_members 
  
-0.00582 
  
-0.00645 
   
(0.00998) 
  
(0.00984) 
Trading 
  
-0.0339 
  
-0.0340 
   
(0.0273) 
  
(0.0267) 
Fishery 
  
0.0313 
  
0.0317 
   
(0.0478) 
  
(0.0459) 
Manufacturing 
  
-0.000805 
  
-0.00348 
   
(0.0305) 
  
(0.0303) 
Loancycle 
  
-0.00200 
  
-0.00214 
   
(0.00261) 
  
(0.00257) 
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Observations 191 191 187 191 191 187 
R-squared 0.027 0.072 0.131       
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: share of the endowment 
sent by senders in the dictator game. Omitted benchmarks: married, matara, agriculture. Variable legend for regressors, 
see Table 1. 
 
Table 5 -  Determinants Of Expected Giving 
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Expected Giving OLS OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
              
Damaged -0.0494* -0.0496* -0.0753** -0.0490* -0.0490* -0.0758*** 
 
(0.0277) (0.0272) (0.0290) (0.0289) (0.0283) (0.0289) 
Riskloving_ratio 
 
-0.0386 -0.0413 
 
-0.0460 -0.0479 
  
(0.0600) (0.0620) 
 
(0.0647) (0.0641) 
Switch 
 
-0.0135*** -0.0129*** 
 
-0.0140*** -0.0134*** 
  
(0.00465) (0.00460) 
 
(0.00494) (0.00469) 
Age 
  
-4.40e-05 
  
-0.000258 
   
(0.00141) 
  
(0.00142) 
Sngle 
  
-0.0101 
  
-0.00697 
   
(0.0596) 
  
(0.0575) 
Widowed 
  
0.0465 
  
0.0489 
   
(0.0438) 
  
(0.0425) 
Separated 
  
0.112* 
  
0.118** 
   
(0.0574) 
  
(0.0588) 
Male 
  
-0.0678 
  
-0.0671 
   
(0.0584) 
  
(0.0560) 
Food_exp_std 
  
-0.00365 
  
-0.00369 
   
(0.00399) 
  
(0.00399) 
Galle 
  
-0.0743** 
  
-0.0763** 
   
(0.0340) 
  
(0.0339) 
Hambantota 
  
-0.0296 
  
-0.0338 
   
(0.0395) 
  
(0.0402) 
Years_schooling 
  
-0.00909* 
  
-0.00946* 
   
(0.00547) 
  
(0.00543) 
N_house_members 
  
0.00592 
  
0.00600 
   
(0.0117) 
  
(0.0116) 
Trading 
  
0.0474 
  
0.0505* 
   
(0.0297) 
  
(0.0293) 
Fshery 
  
0.0330 
  
0.0333 
   
(0.0623) 
  
(0.0604) 
Manufacturing 
  
-0.0442 
  
-0.0458* 
   
(0.0272) 
  
(0.0274) 
Loancycle 
  
0.0107 
  
0.0116 
   
(0.00779) 
  
(0.00812) 
       Observations 191 191 186 191 191 186 
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R-squared 0.016 0.060 0.175       
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: share of the sender’s 
endowment expected by receivers in the dictator game. Omitted benchmarks: married, matara, agriculture. Variable 
legend, see Table 1. 
 
Second, we repeat the econometric analysis for receiver’s expectations about sender’s giving (Table 
5) and find the same pattern of results as those observed for senders. Time preferences matter in this 
analysis as the more impatient participants (i.e., those switching later to the higher but delayed 
payoff alternative in the lottery, variable switch) tend to expect less than the less impatient ones 
Regarding the impact of the tsunami, having received at least one damage reduces the receiver's 
expected giving by 5 percentage points in the baseline estimate and by approximately 8 percentage 
points when we include other covariates.  
Finally, we test the impact of the tsunami shock for the entire sample of participants (Tables 6.1 and 
6.2), controlling for the heterogeneity in the sender/receiver status with the receiver dummy. This 
specification allows us to test for the presence of a local social norm about giving that would exist if 
giving and expected giving were not statistically different. Since receivers expect significantly more 
than what senders actually give, no evidence of a local “sharing/solidarity norm” is found in our 
data. Controlling for the presence of such a norm is important as it may represent an additional 
hidden driver of respondents’ choices in the game. Results are consistent with those previously 
presented, with the damaged sending/expecting 5 to 6 percentage points more than what non-
damaged individuals do (Table 6.1).  
 
Table 6.1 - Determinants of giving and expected giving jointly considered 
Dep. Var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Respondent's behavior OLS OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
Receiver 0.0675*** 0.0677*** 0.0681*** 0.0686*** 0.0687*** 0.0693*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0191) (0.0198) (0.0200) (0.0198) (0.0201) 
Damaged -0.0554*** -0.0523*** -0.0610*** -0.0551*** -0.0517** -0.0609*** 
 
(0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0207) (0.0202) (0.0202) (0.0209) 
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Riskloving_ratio 
 
0.0368 0.0409 
 
0.0354 0.0395 
  
(0.0380) (0.0391) 
 
(0.0400) (0.0404) 
Switch 
 
-0.0106*** -0.0113*** 
 
-0.0109*** -0.0117*** 
  
(0.00327) (0.00330) 
 
(0.00341) (0.00339) 
Age 
  
-0.00130 
  
-0.00142 
   
(0.000911) 
  
(0.000927) 
Single 
  
-0.0264 
  
-0.0228 
   
(0.0500) 
  
(0.0492) 
Widowed 
  
0.0464 
  
0.0490 
   
(0.0303) 
  
(0.0300) 
Separated 
  
0.124*** 
  
0.125*** 
   
(0.0465) 
  
(0.0458) 
Male 
  
-0.00202 
  
-0.00304 
   
(0.0404) 
  
(0.0408) 
Food_exp_std 
  
-0.000775 
  
-0.000739 
   
(0.000891) 
  
(0.000890) 
Galle 
  
-0.0462* 
  
-0.0470* 
   
(0.0245) 
  
(0.0248) 
Hambantota 
  
-0.0429* 
  
-0.0439* 
   
(0.0251) 
  
(0.0256) 
Years_schooling 
  
-0.00642 
  
-0.00659 
   
(0.00404) 
  
(0.00404) 
N_house_members 
  
-0.000852 
  
-0.000887 
   
(0.00780) 
  
(0.00784) 
Trading 
  
0.0109 
  
0.0127 
   
(0.0201) 
  
(0.0203) 
Fishery 
  
0.0428 
  
0.0433 
   
(0.0350) 
  
(0.0343) 
Manufacturing 
  
-0.0203 
  
-0.0229 
   
(0.0205) 
  
(0.0209) 
Loancycle 
  
0.00375 
  
0.00407 
   
(0.00392) 
  
(0.00410) 
       Observations 382 382 373 382 382 373 
R-squared 0.050 0.081 0.125       
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: share of the 
endowment sent for senders while share of the sender’s endowment expected for receivers in the dictator 
game. Omitted benchmarks: married, matara, agriculture. Variable legend, see Table 1. 
 
5.2 The impact of tsunami damages and recovery aid  
To investigate the tsunami impact at the intensive margin and the role of recovery aid, we re-
estimate the model in Table 6.1 by replacing the damaged dummy with N_damages, help_ab_mean 
and their interaction. The results, reported in Table 6.2, confirm previous findings. On the one hand, 
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receiving significantly more help does not directly affect behavior in the dictator game (variable 
help_ab_mean). Each additional damage, on the other, has a detrimental effect on generosity 
(variable N_damages). This effect, however, is compensated by the interaction between aid and 
damages (variable N_damages*help_ab_mean).7 When we further divide our sample into three 
groups to consider separately those suffering high damages, low damages and no damages, we find 
that the interaction effect is significant only for the first and not for the third group (Table 6.2B in 
the online Appendix A.5).  
 
Table 6.2 - Tsunami and aid effects on altruistic preferences 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Whole sample Giving Exp. Giving Whole sample Giving Exp. Giving 
 OLS OLS OLS TOBIT TOBIT TOBIT 
              
Receiver 0.0678*** 
  
0.0691*** 
  
 
(0.0203) 
  
(0.0206) 
  N_damages -0.0258*** -0.0245** -0.0240*** -0.0258*** -0.0242** -0.0236*** 
 
(0.00693) (0.0119) (0.00895) (0.00685) (0.0115) (0.00854) 
Help_ab_mean -0.0217 -0.0150 -0.0202 -0.0209 -0.0127 -0.0200 
 
(0.0264) (0.0388) (0.0392) (0.0261) (0.0373) (0.0382) 
N_damages*help_ab_mean 0.0331*** 0.0234 0.0355** 0.0333*** 0.0229 0.0359** 
 
(0.0104) (0.0150) (0.0173) (0.0104) (0.0145) (0.0169) 
Riskloving_ratio 0.0600 0.133*** -0.0223 0.0589 0.136*** -0.0294 
 
(0.0402) (0.0505) (0.0639) (0.0413) (0.0494) (0.0655) 
Switch -0.0134*** -0.00880* -0.0165*** -0.0138*** -0.00905* -0.0171*** 
 
(0.00334) (0.00470) (0.00486) (0.00342) (0.00460) (0.00492) 
Age -0.00168* -0.00184 -0.00103 -0.00180* -0.00186 -0.00127 
 
(0.000904) (0.00123) (0.00148) (0.000921) (0.00120) (0.00149) 
Single -0.0374 -0.0666 -0.0289 -0.0340 -0.0633 -0.0270 
 
(0.0505) (0.0676) (0.0794) (0.0495) (0.0643) (0.0758) 
Widowed 0.0480 0.0165 0.0582 0.0504* 0.0182 0.0604 
 
(0.0292) (0.0379) (0.0408) (0.0288) (0.0362) (0.0396) 
Separated 0.0954** 0.0951 0.0906 0.0967** 0.0940 0.0963 
 
(0.0473) (0.0761) (0.0699) (0.0466) (0.0725) (0.0698) 
Male 0.000229 0.0293 -0.0713 -0.000771 0.0262 -0.0707 
 
(0.0418) (0.0591) (0.0633) (0.0419) (0.0582) (0.0600) 
Food_exp_std -0.000769 -0.000716 -0.00447 -0.000732 -0.000644 -0.00462 
 
(0.000887) (0.000979) (0.00412) (0.000882) (0.000950) (0.00408) 
Galle -0.0430* -0.0236 -0.0503 -0.0438* -0.0226 -0.0517 
																																																						
7 As far as the magnitude is concerned, a unit increase in N_damages generates a reduction of about 
2.5/3% in giving and expected giving. A unit increase of N_damages if help_ab_mean is equal to 
one raises the aggregate behavior (i.e. giving and expected giving jointly considered) by about 3.3% 
(columns 1 and 4, Table 6.2). 
		 27	
 
(0.0243) (0.0362) (0.0344) (0.0246) (0.0357) (0.0341) 
Hambantota -0.0442* -0.0538 -0.0248 -0.0451* -0.0521 -0.0288 
 
(0.0259) (0.0367) (0.0411) (0.0263) (0.0356) (0.0415) 
Years_schooling -0.00636 -0.00224 -0.00818 -0.00651 -0.00226 -0.00850 
 
(0.00413) (0.00666) (0.00585) (0.00412) (0.00642) (0.00575) 
N_house_members -0.00221 -0.00591 0.00588 -0.00226 -0.00657 0.00608 
 
(0.00757) (0.0103) (0.0116) (0.00759) (0.0101) (0.0114) 
Trading 0.0132 -0.0235 0.0397 0.0150 -0.0234 0.0429 
 
(0.0202) (0.0289) (0.0301) (0.0203) (0.0280) (0.0295) 
Fishery 0.0493 0.0396 0.0309 0.0493 0.0405 0.0293 
 
(0.0398) (0.0599) (0.0694) (0.0389) (0.0571) (0.0674) 
Manufacturing -0.0130 0.00337 -0.0296 -0.0155 0.000607 -0.0309 
 
(0.0207) (0.0314) (0.0282) (0.0212) (0.0309) (0.0281) 
Loancycle 0.00426 0.000576 0.00748 0.00459 0.000388 0.00826 
 
(0.00400) (0.00274) (0.00770) (0.00420) (0.00266) (0.00799) 
       
Observations 363 182 181 363 182 181 
R-squared 0.137 0.126 0.182    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: share of the endowment 
sent for senders while share of the sender’s endowment expected for receivers in the dictator game, Omitted 
benchmarks: married, matara, agriculture. Variable legend, see Table 1. 
 
The regression results in Table 6.2 may not however appear fully consistent with those reported in 
the descriptive analysis in Table 3 (see section 4) where highly damaged participants seemed not to 
differ much in terms of generosity with respect to non-damaged and less-damaged ranked the 
lowest (see Panel A.1 and B.1, Table 3). An explanation to this apparent inconsistency may derive 
from the fact that the N_damages variable in Panel B.1 in Table 3 would capture not only the 
tsunami impact at an intensive margin but also the effect of high recovery aid received by the highly 
damaged participants. For this reason, in order to make an intensive-margin analysis that takes into 
account simultaneously i) individual characteristics, ii) their risk/time preferences, and iii) 
generosity of those not damaged and less damaged by the tsunami - while at the same time 
disentangling the recovery aid effect from that of the number of damages - one would need to 
consider a regression analysis as that implemented in Table 6.2.  
5.3 Interpretation of the empirical results 
To summarize the main econometric findings, our econometric results confirm in general our 
alternative hypotheses (H1i,ii and H1v,vi) showing that i) having received at least one damage from 
the tsunami reduces giving and expected giving, ii) while there is no direct effect of recovery aid,  a 
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large number of damages per se reduce generosity, and iii) this last effect is compensated by the 
large amount of recovery assistance targeting highly damaged individuals.  
Since this last effect occurs only for the highly damaged and not for the other two groups - those 
suffering fewer damages and those suffering no damage – the economic and psychological 
rationales jointly with the indirect-reciprocal type of preferences described in section 2 can explain 
our interaction result. In this last respect, our result is particularly strong as the indirect 
reciprocation occurs in a one-shot anonymous interaction, and therefore, it cannot be explained by 
reputational concerns as it occurs in empirical tests of indirect reciprocity with repeated interactions 
(e.g. Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; Bolton et al., 2005). Furthermore, the first action triggering 
indirect reciprocity is not produced experimentally, but rather, it is a 7-year distance event, and, as 
an event, it is certainly more important and memorable to affected players than those events 
produced in artificial experiments.  
In a further robustness check where we look at giving/expected giving in relation to different type 
of damages we find that the effect is concentrated on the economic damage (Table 6.3). This 
finding is consistent with the rationales behind our alternative hypothesis (H1v,vi) indicating that the 
negative effect of giving should be higher for damaged individuals receiving relatively lower aid. 
 
Table 6.3 - Tsunami and injury effects on altruistic preferences 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Giving Expected Giving Giving and Expected Giving 
  
   receiver 
  
0.0638*** 
   
(0.0197) 
Economic damages -0.0625* -0.0847** -0.0741*** 
 
(0.0324) (0.0347) (0.0235) 
Injuries -0.00132 0.00290 0.0114 
 
(0.0401) (0.0493) (0.0332) 
Damages to house 0.0503 0.0573 0.0557* 
 
(0.0351) (0.0471) (0.0289) 
riskloving_ratio 0.103** -0.0458 0.0312 
 
(0.0493) (0.0605) (0.0389) 
Switch -0.00799* -0.0126*** -0.0111*** 
 
(0.00474) (0.00447) (0.00323) 
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Socio-demographic controls YES YES YES 
    Observations 185 186 371 
R-squared 0.128 0.180 0.130 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
6. TACKLING ENDOGENEITY 
A possible bias affecting the causal interpretation of our findings may result from the non-random 
assignment of the damaged status as signaled by the balancing properties in Table A3.1 in the 
online Appendix. Although the impact of this source of bias is likely mitigated by the selection of 
only microfinance borrowers and the comparison of mostly balanced subsamples based on the 
amount of damage and aid, we account for the remaining potential endogeneity with a weighted 
least squares estimation (subsection 6.1), instrumental variable regressions (subsection 6.2-6.3) and 
a sensitivity analysis on the exogeneity assumption (subsection 6.4). We believe that, as suggested 
by the balancing properties in Panels B and C of Table A3.1 (in the online Appendix), the potential 
bias would only affect the results of the impact of the tsunami at the extensive margin (i.e., 
damaged vs. non-damaged) but not those of its impact at the intensive margin (i.e., within damaged 
according to damage intensity) or its impact on the aid-compensation effect. Using data from the Sri 
Lankan 2011-Census, we finally correct for the non-representativeness of our sample (subsection 
6.5) 
6.1 Weighted least squares  
To reduce identification concerns arising from the potentially endogenous self-selection of the 
villagers into the damage status (damaged), we re-estimate the models in Tables 4, 5, 6.1 and 6.2 
with weighted least squares by weighting each observation with the inverse of its estimated 
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propensity score for receiving at least one damage from the tsunami8. All of the main results 
illustrated above are robust to this check and are reported, respectively, in Tables 4A, 5A, 6.1A and 
6.2A in the online Appendix A. 
6.2 Instrumental variable regressions 
We enrich our identification strategy through an instrumental variable re-estimation of the 
specification mostly suspected of endogeneity (i.e., the damaged/non-damaged tsunami effect). We 
believe the first natural instrument is the individual's distance from the coast at the moment of the 
tsunami, even though the presence/absence of natural barriers makes the protection capacity of such 
distance heterogeneous. The instrument seems logically and statistically relevant as those living 
closer to the coast are more likely to be damaged by the tsunami (Table A3.1 in the online 
Appendix). It is also likely to be logically valid as it is difficult to justify how the difference in 
terms of distance from the coast across individuals may affect their preferences through non-
observables factors other than victimization status9. 
																																																						
8 Specifically, for each individual, the weights are computed as !"#"$%!!"#$%& !"#"$%!  +  !!!"#"$%!!!!"#$%& !"#"$%! , 
where pscore is a non-parametric estimate of the propensity score for the probability of receiving at 
least one damage (i.e., damaged dummy). The pscore is estimated using BMI and distant as 
excluded regressors (from the outcome equation) and years_schooling, galle, hambantota, 
years_schooling, trading, fishery, manufacturing, loancycle as regressors common to both the 
treatment and the outcome equations (see footnotes of Tables in the online Appendix A.4 and 
variable legend in Table 1). The latter are chosen as less sensitive to changes in time after the 
tsunami and so to guarantee the satisfaction of the balancing property. For details on this 
methodological approach, see, among others, Blattman and Annan (2010) and Hirano et al. (2003). 
9 Note also that the few observables in which the two groups of damaged/non damaged individuals 
differ do not affect generosity in previous econometric estimates (see Tables 4-6.1).  
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A second instrument we use is the individual's body mass index (BMI) defined as the individual's 
body mass divided by the square of her/his height. In this case, the instrument appears logically 
valid as it is difficult to consider an unobservable and statistically significant link between body 
characteristics and social preferences apart from victimization status. In addition, if we interpret the 
BMI as a proxy for health conditions or fitness, we may expect the BMI to be a valid instrument as 
more fit and healthy individuals (i.e., neither over- nor under-weight, nor in poor health) were 
reasonably more likely to escape damages (and presumably recover faster) than less fit/less healthy 
individuals. This is supported by our data as the mean BMI of tsunami-injured is greater than that of 
non-injured borrowers (t = -2.46125; p-value = 0.0071). The same is true when comparing BMI of 
those reporting injuries to family members vis-à-vis those who do not report such injuries (t = -
1.5597; p-value = 0.0598). We as well test whether the BMI effect on injury is U-shaped and find 
that the hypothesis is not supported by our data since the overweight/obese vs. normal weight 
difference is significant while the underweight vs. normal weight difference is not. The 
interpretation is that higher BMI clearly reduces agility and possibility to escape while this is not 
always the case for the underweight share. 
 
Table 6.4 - Determinants of giving and expected giving jointly considered (IV estimates) 
Dep Var: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Respondent's behavior     
          
Receiver 0.0681*** 0.0687*** 0.0709*** 0.0713*** 
 
(0.0193) (0.0193) (0.0194) (0.0194) 
Damaged -0.0939** -0.0866* -0.0953** -0.0855* 
 
(0.0414) (0.0472) (0.0402) (0.0459) 
Riskloving_ratio 
 
0.0413 
 
0.0344 
  
(0.0381) 
 
(0.0383) 
Switch 
 
-0.0112*** 
 
-0.0116*** 
  
(0.00320) 
 
(0.00322) 
Age 
 
-0.00119 
 
-0.000983 
  
(0.000938) 
 
(0.000928) 
Single 
 
-0.0219 
 
-0.0217 
  
(0.0504) 
 
(0.0507) 
Widowed 
 
0.0498* 
 
0.0475 
  
(0.0296) 
 
(0.0296) 
Separated 
 
0.134*** 
 
0.132*** 
  
(0.0491) 
 
(0.0494) 
Male 
 
0.00358 
 
0.00269 
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(0.0409) 
 
(0.0409) 
Food_exp_std 
 
-0.000719 
 
-0.000682 
  
(0.000858) 
 
(0.000859) 
Galle 
 
-0.0437* 
 
-0.0458* 
  
(0.0239) 
 
(0.0245) 
Hambantota 
 
-0.0441* 
 
-0.0397 
  
(0.0248) 
 
(0.0248) 
Years_schooling 
 
-0.00691* 
 
-0.00662* 
  
(0.00402) 
 
(0.00399) 
N_house_members 
 
9.11e-05 
 
1.48e-05 
  
(0.00791) 
 
(0.00788) 
Trading 
 
0.0141 
 
0.0127 
  
(0.0205) 
 
(0.0205) 
Fishery 
 
0.0514 
 
0.0506 
  
(0.0363) 
 
(0.0394) 
Manufacturing 
 
-0.0203 
 
-0.0211 
  
(0.0200) 
 
(0.0200) 
Loancycle 
 
0.00422 
 
0.00396 
  
(0.00392) 
 
(0.00389) 
     
Observations 382 373 379 370 
R-squared 0.040 0.121 0.039 0.120 
     
Instruments distant distant distant, BMI distant, BMI 
Endogeneity C-test for damaged: p-value 0.309 0.560 0.242 0.545 
Test of excluded instruments (Weak Id.Test): F-stat 108.763 79.891 58.319 41.48 
Overid.test: c2     0.077 0.181 
Overid.test: p-value     0.782 0.670 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variable: share of the endowment 
sent for senders while share of the sender’s endowment expected for receivers in the dictator game. Omitted 
benchmarks: married, matara, agriculture. Variable legend, see Table 1. 
 
We re-estimate the OLS specifications of Table 6.1 by instrumenting the damaged dummy first 
with a dummy equal to one if the individual lived at above the median sample distance from the 
coast at the time of tsunami (distant) and then with both instruments (distant and BMI). Results are 
reported in Table 6.4. In all of the specifications (with/without demographic controls) with the 
distant instrument, the effect of receiving at least one damage from the tsunami is significant and 
strong in magnitude (i.e., tsunami damaged send/expect approximately 9 percent to 10 percent less 
than non-damaged). When both instruments are used, the damaged effect remains significant and 
relatively close in magnitude to that found in the previous estimates. Importantly, the first stage F-
statistics are significantly high in all cases, confirming the logical relevance of our instruments. 
Furthermore, the Sargan (1958) test suggests we cannot reject the null over-identifying restrictions 
(Table 6.4, columns 3 and 4), and the endogeneity C-test (GMM distance) cannot reject the null that 
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the damaged dummy is exogenous. These statistics provide further evidence sopporting the validity 
of our identification strategy.   
6.3 Discussion 
The validity of the distant instrument hinges on the assumption that distance from the coast and 
generosity are correlated only through victimization. It is possible, however, that the individual’s 
location choice is endogenously based on unobservable factors that influence both generosity and 
victimization. One such factor can be, for instance, the pre-tsunami risk attitudes towards natural 
events, as individuals with higher (lower) expectations of a shock and/or who are more (less) risk 
averse can decide to live farther from (nearer to) the coast. Because we do not have pre-tsunami 
data, however, we cannot control for ex-ante risk preferences. Thus, it must be noted that because 
the 2004 tsunami was completely unexpected, location decisions may be, at best, marginally driven 
by a pre-existing background risk of a tsunami.   
A possible third omitted factor affecting the validity of the instrument distant is the pre-tsunami 
profitability of the employment sector, which may be correlated with social preferences. More 
specifically, individuals expecting higher returns from agriculture may have decided to live farther 
from the coast than those expecting higher returns from fishing and, instead, opted to live on the 
seaside. To test this, the average per-capita food expenditure (our proxy for income) for farmers is 
compared with that of fishermen. The difference is not statistically significant (two-sided p-value = 
0.8654), thus supporting the validity of the exclusion restriction.  
Another source of endogeneity may arise from post-tsunami differential migration based on 
unobservable factors (i.e., individual's ability to be in social networks), which may be correlated 
with both generosity and tsunami exposition. We do not believe migration can affect our estimates, 
as it is a very limited occurrence (as documented by AMF). As previously discussed, there would 
have been also little incentive for borrowers to migrate after the tsunami because of the extremely 
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favorable conditions on the micro-loan offered by AMF and the huge amount of local and 
international aid flows (Becchetti and Castriota, 2010 and 2011). Similar evidence is provided by 
Paul (2005) with respect to tsunami-victims in Bangladesh.  
 A potentially spurious explanation of our findings may also be related to a more general income 
effect. The differential between giving and expected giving based on damage and aid might be 
explained by wealth or income variation before and after the tsunami, a factor that we cannot 
observe. Although we do not have pre-tsunami levels of income, income is not likely to drive our 
results since it is proxied for by many controls in our estimates (e.g. current employment sector10, 
current level of food expenditures, level of education and risk and time preferences).  
All the above-mentioned remaining endogeneity issues are addressed below through a sensitivity 
analysis on the exogeneity assumption behind our results. 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis  
Admittedly, the unobserved pre-tsunami level of generosity – and/or other unobserved 
characteristics - may determine spurious results if correlated with our “treatment” (T, tsunami-
damages) and the “outcome” (Y, ex-post levels of generosity) variables. If not controlled for, such 
unobservable characteristics may limit the internal validity of our results. In order to check to what 
extent unobservables of these types (U) may reduce the significance or the magnitude of our 
estimated average treatment effect (ATE) of the tsunami-damage on generosity, we implement the 
sensitivity analysis on departures from the exogeneity assumption as proposed by Imbens (2003), 
operationalized by Harada (2012) and applied to a relevant case by, among others, Blattman and 
Annan (2010). The methodology and the results are described in details in the online Appendix A.7. 
The results of the sensitivity analysis highlight that the baseline ATE of the tsunami-damage on 
																																																						
10 The employment sector can be reasonably assumed to be persistent in time, as most businesses 
are family-based and job skills are usually transmitted inter-generationally within the household.  
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generosity estimated under the assumption of exogeneity is robust when this assumption is relaxed 
and the impact of unobserved characteristics (e.g., ex-ante levels of generosity) is simulated as 
being potentially correlated both with the damage status and ex-post generosity.   
6.5 Correction for the non-representativeness of our sample 
Since our sample is composed by microfinance borrowers, our results may suffer from limited 
external validity with reference to the entire Sri Lankan population. To account for this problem, we 
weight our main estimates with the inverse of the probability of being selected in the sample. Such 
probabilities are constructed as post-stratification weights by comparing the sample proportion of 
individuals in the age, gender, marital status, village and education categories to the population 
proportion. The population margins are obtained from the Sri Lanka Census in 2011 (the year of our 
fieldwork) and post-stratification weights are calculated with the raking method (Deming, 1943 and 
Kalton, 1983) that adjusts the sampling weights so that the marginal totals of the adjusted weights 
on the specified characteristics (gender, age, marital status, education, village) are consistent with 
the corresponding totals for the Sri Lankan population.  
The algorithm involves repeatedly estimating weights across each set of variables until the weights 
converge and stop changing. Essentially, raking forces the survey totals to match the known 
population totals by assigning a weight to each respondent.11 Estimation results reported in the 
online Appendix A (Tables A6a-A6c) are consistent with the main findings, in particular with those 
in our main regressions (Tables 4-6.2). This evidence shows that our results - behind being relevant 
per se as related to an important target of the population in terms of economic development and 
poverty reduction - seems to be externally valid also for the rest of the population. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
																																																						
11 The procedure is discussed in details in the online Appendix A.6. 
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The tsunami shock is an unfortunate event that creates a unique framework for investigating the 
effects of a disaster on individual preferences. The characteristics of the event are such that people 
who are only a few meters from each other at the time of the shock are almost randomly either 
affected or unaffected. The chance of being affected has already been exploited by several studies. 
The originality of our paper is in testing similar hypotheses over a longer time distance by using 
within village variability between damaged and non-damaged individuals and exploiting the 
variability in damage and recovery aid intensity.  
We test the effect of the shock at the extensive margin by comparing damaged with non-damaged 
individuals in terms of giving and expected giving in a dictator game. Moreover, at the intensive 
margin, we compare the participants based on the amount of damage experienced and recovery aid 
received. The advantage of this last comparison is that differences in observables between the 
groups are by far lower. We reduce further identification problems by selecting a random sample of 
damaged and non-damaged borrowers belonging to the same microfinance organization who are, 
therefore, likely to share some important common traits (e.g. entrepreneurial and social skills). 
These characteristics are usually unobservable to researchers while suspected to be among the main 
determinants of self-selection bias. Given the lack of pre-tsunami data, we complete our 
identification strategy with inverse p-score weighted least squares, instrumental variable and a 
sensitivity analysis on the exogeneity assumption. Our main findings are robust to all these checks.   
Our analysis highlights two original results. One, both at the intensive and extensive margins, 
individuals damaged by the tsunami give and expect less than non-damaged even seven years after 
the event. Two, though recovery aid does not generally affect generosity per se in the long-run, it 
does so in a positive way for individuals more intensely affected by the tsunami.  
Despite of the above-mentioned robustness checks for endogeneity, residual risks of selection bias 
cannot be fully excluded if the more damaged individuals who are ex-ante not as cooperative and 
generous as the current borrowers are also more likely to join microfinance ex-post, thereby 
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producing a spurious negative correlation between the extent of damage and generosity. This 
problem is, however, unlikely to arise since entry of highly damaged new members was excluded 
by AMF (and donor’s rules) that focused on recovering from distress by supporting old members. 
Beyond this official policy, there were clearly no economic incentives for both AMF and group 
borrowers to accept after the tsunami new highly damaged members, especially if they would not 
share the same pro-social attitudes of the rest of the “club”. The risk of adverse selection and 
strategic default of the former and the assortative matching approach of the latter (e.g. Gathak, 
2000) should therefore converge to mitigate selection bias. These arguments would also apply to the 
hypothetical case in which AMF lowered the altruism standards to lend to low-damage individuals. 
Hiring borrowers with lower moral values for the organization (and for group borrowers) is 
problematic in the long run since uncooperative groups often fail to repay due to joint liability and 
are denied future loans.  
As to the external validity of our results, looking at national Census data for the three considered 
districts of Galle, Matara and Hambantota12 we find that our database of microfinance borrowers is 
undersampled in terms of gender composition (only 6.5 percent males against a three-province 
weighted average figure of 48.2 percent) and unemployment status (0 percent by definition in our 
sample against 8.2 percent in the whole country). In addition, being a dataset of microfinance self-
employed workers, the sample average age of 46 years is higher than the country average of 31 , 
which includes children and young people who are not economically active. The remaining socio-
demographic characteristics are in line with those of the local population (e.g. Sinhalese ethnic and 
Buddhist religion share close to 90-95 percent in the three provinces, 85 percent share of rural 
population and 90 percent literacy rate). Our results, however, are robust to a post-stratification 
weighted least squares estimate based on Census data aimed at addressing non-representativeness of 
the sample. 
																																																						
12 The 2011-Census data is available at http://www.statistics.gov.lk  
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Beyond potential limits to the generalization of our findings to the overall population, our study on 
a specific population group (women microfinance borrowers) is nonetheless of great relevance. In 
South Asia microfinance is largely addressed to women and in Sri Lanka, as in many other 
countries, it is recognized as a fundamental tool to address poverty and social inclusion and as a 
gateway to access more traditional financing sources for small producers.  
In addition, the behavioral literature tells us that giving is an important (non strategic) source of 
trust and trustworthiness in social dilemmas such as trust investment games (e.g. Johnson and 
Mislin, 2011 and Cox, 2004) and, as such, one of the most important sources of the superadditive 
benefits stemming from cooperation in the widespread “grey areas” of socio-economic interactions 
that are not covered by contract protection. In this sense the idea that tsunami may create a “wound” 
to giving is of great importance as solving social dilemmas is at the basis of cooperation and, 
therefore, a microeconomic source of productivity and growth.  
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